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The Constitutional Rights of Advanced Robots
(and of Human Beings)
R. George Wright*

I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional rights create and destroy otherwise available
options for the rights-bearer, for governments, and for affected
third parties. Thus, conferring a constitutional right always
requires at least some minimal defense.1 But conferring a
constitutional right can certainly be appropriate if the recipient of
the right seems to deserve or otherwise qualify for the right in
question, or if conferring the right makes sense on other, perhaps
partly pragmatic, grounds.
Among our civic responsibilities is to better understand the
nature, justification, and the appropriate scope and extension of
constitutional rights. Most often, we consider these matters in
some specific political context.2 But it is also possible to reflect
upon these dimensions of constitutional rights from a more
detached perspective, stimulated by hypothetical, or at least less
pressing, circumstances.
This Article takes the latter tack and seeks to enhance our
understanding of constitutional rights for humans by considering
the provocative case of what might be termed “advanced robots.”
*
Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598-602 (2015) (conferring the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause to same-sex couples’ choice to marry,
reasoning that the four fundamental constitutional purposes for marriage—individual
autonomy, intimate association, protection of children and family, and social order—apply
equally to same-sex couples); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-44 (1963)
(conferring the Sixth Amendment to indigent criminal defendants, reasoning that justice
would not be done if this safeguard—and “fundamental human right[] of life and liberty”—
was not extended to them).
2. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 (prohibiting denial of voting rights on the
basis of sex); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (prohibiting racial
discrimination in public schools); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599-601 (recognizing a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage on the basis of equal protection and substantive due
process).
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We should want any future advanced robot constitutional rights
cases to be decided correctly, and on the best grounds. In the
meantime, considering such cases may enhance our broader
understandings of the nature, justification, and the scope and
extension of constitutional rights for the rest of us.
The reflections below on the capacities of advanced robots
address questions of deserving, or being entitled to, typical
constitutional rights.3 What does it take, that is, to merit the status
of constitutional right-holder or thus, to properly bear a
constitutional right? What must one be like in order to deserve a
constitutional right? What capacities and to what degrees must a
constitutional right-bearer have?
Most of the existing discussions of advanced robots as
potential rights-bearers focus on the idea of some degree of
consciousness, or at best, of self-consciousness with or without a
These qualities of
capacity for sentient experience.4
consciousness, self-consciousness involving a continuing “self,”
and sentience may individually, or in some combination, be
generally necessary in order to have the capacity to bear
constitutional rights.5 No combination of consciousness, selfconsciousness, and sentience, however, generally suffices for
deserving to hold constitutional rights. What is required in
addition turns out to be the possession of both objective and
subjectively adopted interests, as clarified below.6
Consciousness, self-consciousness, and the capacity for
sentient experience are mysterious and are indeed crucially
relevant to the capacity to bear constitutional rights. But neither
alone nor in combination can they suffice for deserving, or being
entitled to, constitutional rights.
Consciousness, selfconsciousness, and even sentience may be present without any
meaningful accompanying emotion or affect.7 Nor do these
3. This is to set aside the possibility of ascribing rights to any entity, including, for
example, traditional sailing ships, on grounds of practical convenience, or for other largely
instrumental reasons. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Section II.
5. See infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 60-89 and accompanying text.
7. GARRY KASPAROV, DEEP THINKING, 70-77 (PublicAffairs 1st ed. 2017)
(explaining that although a machine can make complex medical diagnoses or chess moves,
it is all without “understanding,” and what “matters” to a machine is what we program it to
value) (internal citations omitted).
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attributes, separately or in any combination, imply the existence
of any sustained preferences.8 And most crucially, such attributes
do not imply the existence of either objective or subjectively
adopted interests.9 As it turns out, having both objective and
subjectively adopted interests are essential to meaningful
constitutional rights entitlement.
This basic conclusion, among various other important
conclusions reached below in the context of specific rights, is
explored below with the aid10 of reference to the capacities and
limitations of advanced robots.11

II. ADVANCED ROBOT CAPACITIES,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE ROLE OF
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVELY ADOPTED
INTERESTS
The continuing advance of many computer capacities is
remarkable. The idea of computer programs able to defeat even
the best human chess players is already familiar.12 More
remarkable though, is the idea of a chess-playing robot able to
defeat any human grandmaster through historically
unprecedented tactics, based on a total of four hours of, in large
measure, self-instruction in chess.13 More broadly, the relevant
specialists tend to believe that by mid-century artificial
8. Id. at 72-77.
9. Id. at 70-77.
10. The use of the idea of advanced robots herein seems better described as an
“intuition pump” than as a genuine thought experiment. See DANIEL DENNETT, INTUITION
PUMPS AND OTHER TOOLS FOR THINKING, 5-7 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1st ed. 2013).
11. The references herein to advanced robots could be replaced by references to
androids, cyborgs, or computer-directed entities. The main assumption is that robots are
corporeal, embodied, or physically manifest in ways that, say, computer programs, software,
or complex patterns of electrons are not. We are more comfortable with assigning
constitutional rights to tangible entities, even if we think that an entity deserves constitutional
rights largely in view of its intangible programming. Incidentally, it is possible that
exploring the capacities of advanced robots might also shed light on the idea of constitutional
rights for animals as well. For some recent case law, see Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v.
Lavery, 152 A.D.3d 73, 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017); Naruto v. Slater, 2016 WL 362231, at
*3-4 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Tilikum v. Sea World Parks, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1263 (S.D. Cal.
2012).
12. Supra note 7 at 50-51.
13. See John Naish, Checkmate Humanity, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 21, 2017, 9:16 PM),
www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5204513/Robot-taught-never-see-chess
[https://perma.cc/6VMN-B9M3].
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intelligence will surpass human intelligence in tasks such as
language translation, essay writing, truck driving, retail sales, and
performing surgery.14
All such predictions may, of course, err in either direction.
We need take no position on any such question or even on the
bare possibility of any artificial consciousness, mentality, or
subjectivity. All such questions are controversial. It has been
argued that, at a minimum, the familiar laws of nature do not rule
out subjectivity in humanly developed artifacts.15 Some believe
that there is good reason to believe in such possibilities.16 Others
believe that machine consciousness is not only possible, but
impending.17 It has also been argued that consciousness is a firstperson experience that is simply not subject to objective thirdperson validation.18 In sharp contrast though, the argument has
been made that even the most advanced computers will inevitably
lack genuine beliefs, desires, motivations, autonomy, agency, and
intelligence in a crucial sense,19 or at the very least that genuine
machine consciousness is unlikely even over the long term.20
For our purposes, we need not endorse any of these views.21
Nor need we, within limits, specify a particular definition of

14. See Katja Grace, John Salvatier, Allan Dafoe, Baobao Zhang & Owain Evans,
When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts 3-14 (May 3, 2018),
https://arXiv.org/pdf/1705.08807.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV6R-95P6].
15. See, e.g., Riccardo Mazotti & Vincenzo Tagliasco, Artificial Consciousness: A
Discipline Between Technological and Theoretical Obstacles, 44 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
IN MED. 105, 107 (2008).
16. See, e.g., DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND 332 (Oxford University
Press 1996).
17. See, e.g., Yuri Barzov, Conscious Machines Are Here. What’s Next?, TOWARDS
DATA SCIENCE (June 21, 2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/conscious-machines-arehere-whats-next-d601ac4e638e [https://perma.cc/XV7J-EQQD].’
18. See, e.g., A. L. NELSON, ARTIFICIAL LIFE AND MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS 52,
(AAAI Fall Symposium Series: AAAI Technical Report FS-13-02 vol. 2 2013).
19. Professor John Searle is a leading exponent of such views. John R. Searle, What
Your Computer Can’t Know, 61 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS at 52, 52–54 (October 9,
2014) (reviewing The 4th Revolution: How the Infosphere Is Reshaping Human Reality by
Luciano Floridi and Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies by Nick Bostrom).’
20. See, e.g., Harry Haroutioun Haladjian & Carlos Montemayor, Artificial
Consciousness and the Consciousness-Attention Dissociation, 46 CONSCIOUSNESS AND
COGNITION 210, 210 (2016).
21. Cf. NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 22
(2014) (holding open the possibility that a superintelligent machine could experience what
is referred to as qualia, or subjective conscious experience).
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consciousness itself.22 Consciousness in some advanced robots
will herein be taken merely as a hypothetical, but stimulating and
fruitful, assumption.
The mere idea of a conscious robot has already provoked the
question whether such robots would be entitled to moral or legal
rights.23 If consciousness, rudimentary or sophisticated, is
essential to any entitlement to rights, we would then need some
satisfactory means of determining whether a given entity should
count as conscious or not.
The related question of whether a given entity is genuinely
capable of thinking was famously explored by Alan Turing.24
Turing imagined a sort of free flowing question-and-answer
format in which screened interrogators reach their best judgment
as to whether the unknown respondent is evidently thinking when
formulating its answers.25 Some critics however, have suggested
that this format leads to too many “false positives,” that questions
beyond a machine’s semantic or metaphysical comprehension can
be responded to with something like apparent playfulness, irony,
subject-changing, or sassy evasion in ways that may falsely
suggest a human respondent.26
An alternative approach to testing for actual thinking, if not
for consciousness or genuine intelligence, relies on the fact that
even many simple sentences are latently ambiguous in ways that
22. See Manzotti & Tagliasco, supra note 15, at 107 (“The international scientific
community has not yet precisely defined the meaning of consciousness.”).
23. See, e.g., Aishwarya Limaye, Friend or Foe: Legal Rights of Artificial
Intelligence, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., 2017, at 1; Christof Koch & Giulio Tononi,
Can We Quantify Machine Consciousness?, IEEE SPECTRUM, June 2017, at 65-69 (noting
the possibility of different degrees of consciousness, and linking “highly conscious”
machines with “intrinsic rights”). The theoretical physicist Max Tegmark adds a further
criterion in arguing that “whether intelligent machines should be granted some form of rights
depends crucially on whether they’re conscious and can suffer or feel joy.” MAX TEGMARK,
LIFE 3.0: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 282 (2017).
24. A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 49 MIND, Oct. 1950, at 433–
34 (presenting the “imitation game” scenario); see also Graham Oppy & David Dowe, The
Turing Test, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-test/ [https://perma.cc/WX6L-YK9C].
25. See Turing, supra note 24, at 433-34.
26. See, e.g., HECTOR J. LEVESQUE, COMMON SENSE, THE TURING TEST, AND THE
QUEST FOR REAL AI 59 (2017); Gary Marcus, What Comes After the Turing Test?, THE NEW
YORKER (June 9, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/what-comes-after-theturing-test [https://perma.cc/NS6T-UD6P]; Gary Marcus, Am I Human?: Researchers Need
New Ways to Distinguish Artificial Intelligence from the Natural Kind, SCI. AM., March
2017, at 59, 60, 63 [hereinafter Marcus, Am I Human?].
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most adults, but as yet no machines, can easily and reliably
interpret.27 Adults in particular handle technically equivocal
pronoun references more readily than do current machines.28
Consider the sentence “The large ball crashed right through the
table because it was made of [s]tyrofoam[]”29 or similarly, “Joan
made sure to thank Susan for all the help she had given.”30
Competent adult speakers immediately recognize that in the
first sentence the pronoun “it” refers to the table, rather than to
the large ball. This is a matter of human language comprehension
and common sense. Similarly, the pronoun “she” in the second
sentence has “Susan” rather than “Joan” as its antecedent. Again,
and despite the phenomenon of occasional genuinely unclear
pronoun antecedents, the meaning is usually clear to competent
adults, but less so to sophisticated contemporary computers.31
Other sorts of tests for computer thought, intelligence, or
consciousness are certainly possible.32 Whatever the tests or
combinations thereof, the most interesting questions arise only
when some sort of advanced robot or other artificial intelligence
unequivocally passes the tests in question. Unless we decide that
appearing to be conscious is the same thing for practical purposes
as actually being conscious, we will have to face up to the
possibility that appearances may not reflect the underlying
reality.33 Belief that other humans have minds can be questioned
in the classroom, but is otherwise normally taken for granted. It
27. See, e.g., LEVESQUE, supra note 26, at 54 (discussing the so-called “Winograd
Schema” that seeks to take useful advantage thereof); Marcus, Am I Human?, supra note 26,
at 61.
28. Marcus, Am I Human?, supra note 26 at 63.
29. Id. (internal citations omitted).
30. LEVESQUE, supra note 26, at 54.
31. Compare Naish, supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting the oddness of a
computer revolutionizing chess after a mere several hours of, in large measure, selfteaching), with ’’Drew Harwell, AI Models Beat Humans at Reading Comprehension, but
They’ve Still Got a Ways to Go, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ais-ability-to-read-hailed-ashistorical-milestone-but-computers-arent-quite-there/2018/01/16/04638f2e-faf6-11e7a46b-a3614530bd87_story.html?utm_term=.f889ff8a5f64
[https://perma.cc/RC7UWKRK] (exploring appropriately dedicated computers which currently struggle with basic
syntax and semantics).
32. Susan Schneider & Edwin Turner, Is Anyone Home? A Way to Find Out If AI Has
Become
Self-Aware,
SCI.
A M.
BLOG
NETWORK
(July
19,
2017),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/is-anyone-home-a-way-to-find-out-if-aihas-become-self-aware/ [https://perma.cc/AN63-KMMB].
33. See, e.g., ALVIN PLANTINGA, GOD AND OTHER MINDS 187-95, 211 (1967).
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is less clear though, that an advanced robot designed to pass our
tests for consciousness or for genuine intelligence would leave us
with no greater residual doubts.34 For all we know, the language
of a genuinely conscious robot might strike us as
incomprehensible.35 Minds might crucially vary at basic levels.36
Thus, it is possible that we could routinely interact with
advanced robots that seem to manifest all the indicia of
consciousness, even to a high degree, while making no
commitment to the idea that those advanced robots really were
conscious.37 We could in this sense maintain the distinction
between external appearance and underlying reality.
As a matter of human psychology though, routinely
maintaining any such doubts might be difficult.38 It has thus been
suggested that “if an android is disposed to behave outwardly
exactly as a normal human being is, then we would find ourselves
unable to effectively interact with it without treating it as if it were
phenomenally conscious.”39 This might be especially true if
advanced robots appeared to spontaneously claim to be
conscious.40
In the fictional realm, the Star Trek android known as Data
presents a provocative case. In the “Measure of a Man” episode,
Data’s creator41, Dr. Bruce Maddox asserts that Data is not a
34. See COLIN MCGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A
MATERIAL WORLD 191 (1999) (“Merely knowing that [a machine] acts as if it were
conscious does not settle the question.”). See also id. at 190.
35. E.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, part II, § xi, at 190
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 2001) (“If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.”).
36. See ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT 6-8 (Bantam ed., 2008) (1950) (displaying the
classic and non-obsolete exposition of robot ethics and its problems and paradoxes); see also
id. at 95 (“‘I see into minds, you see,’ the robot continued, ‘and you have no idea how
complicated they are. I can’t begin to understand everything because my own mind has so
little in common with them.’”).
37. See Brian P. McLaughlin, Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness, in
THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS 415, 426 (2d ed. 2017). See also
MCGINN, supra note 34, at 190-91.
38. This is not to suggest that humans cannot go to great lengths to deny the full
humanity of despised groups, despite all the impeaching evidence readily available. See,
e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, AND
COURTS 3-4 (2006) (showing examples of such denials in practice).
39. McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 426.
40. See Hilary Putnam, Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?, 61 J. PHIL.
668, 688 (1964).
41. We may assume here that having a distinct personal creator, apart from a biological
parent, does not by itself rule out the possibility of conscious personhood with any attendant
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person42 but virtually everyone who interacts routinely with Data
reacts to such a suggestion with something like incredulity,
indignation, or hostility.43 A crew member who denied Data’s
personhood would likely be engaging in a performative
contradiction,44 as the crew members’ own typical language,
emotions, and actions would be difficult to reconcile with
claiming that Data is merely a sophisticated piece of machinery.45
Perhaps our culture will ultimately conclude that there is
simply no consciousness, and no continuing “self” to be
conscious beyond any observable behavior and its material
causes. In the meantime though, the requirements for the
existence of advanced robot consciousness, or any other form of
consciousness, are energetically contested.46
Thus some define consciousness, however vaguely,47 in
terms of self-awareness;48 of being a subject and not merely an
object;49 or of there being something that it is like to be that
entity.50 It has been argued that at a minimum, several elements
are necessary, if not also sufficient, for the existence of
consciousness, including the ability to store51 and process52
substantial information in an integrated way,53 largely
independent of any external influences.54 Other writers have
emphasized the presence of “[r]eactive, contemplative, and

rights. See R. George Wright, The Pale Cast of Thought: On the Legal Status of
Sophisticated Androids, 25 LEGAL STUD. F. 297, 298-301 (2001).
42. See id. at 298-300.
43. See generally id. at 300-01.
44. See generally Martin Morris, On the Logic of the Performative Contradiction:
Habermas and the Radical Critique of Reason, 58 REV. POL. 735 (1996).
45. See Wright, supra note 41, at 298. See generally Dwight Van de Vate, The Problem
of Robot Consciousness, 31 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 149 (1971) (discussing
robot consciousness in a broad scope).
46. See generally Van de Vate, supra note 45.
47. See Aaron Sloman & Ron Chrisley, Virtual Machines and Consciousness, in
MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS 133, 136 (Owen Holland ed., 1974).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See, Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, 83 PHIL. REV. 435 (1974).
Presumably, there is nothing that it is like to be a piece of silicon or, for that matter, a zombie.
51. See TEGMARK, supra note 23, at 304.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.

2019

RIGHTS OF ADVANCED ROBOTS

621

supervisory levels of reasoning . . . .”55 Perhaps more
ambitiously, it has been argued that consciousness requires being
“awake,”56 having “an operational mind,”57 and crucially, an
“automatic, unprompted, undeduced sense of self as protagonist
of the experience . . . .”58
For our purposes, no choice need be made among these more
and less demanding understandings of what consciousness
requires. Crucially, even the most ambitious and demanding
understandings of consciousness, self-consciousness, and
sentience do not amount to sufficient grounds for deserved or
intrinsically merited constitutional rights. The key problem is that
an entity might fulfill all of the requirements for consciousness
without also having, in the required sense, objective and
subjectively adopted interests.59 In the absence of relevant
objective and subjectively adopted interests, appropriately
understood, even a fully conscious, self-conscious, and sentient
being cannot be entitled to constitutional rights.
The idea of an “interest” is itself ambiguous. Distinguishing
among the various meanings of “interest” can occasionally be
tricky. One can take an interest in almost anything, in the sense
of merely wishing to pursue or caring about some matter, perhaps
on arbitrary grounds.60 But in the sense that matters for our
purposes, one might not know for various reasons that one has an
(objective) interest in some process or outcome.61 Of course,
having both a strong objective interest and a strong subjectively
adopted interest in, say, some particular outcome does not mean
that one has a right, let alone a constitutional right, to that

55. See Igor Aleksander, Machine Consciousness, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION
93, 94 (Susan Schneider & Max Velmans eds., 2d ed. 2017).
DAMASIO, SELF COMES TO MIND: CONSTRUCTING THE CONSCIOUS

TO CONSCIOUSNESS
56. ANTONIO
BRAIN 171 (2010).

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., S.I. Benn, ‘Interests’ in Politics, 60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 123, 124 (1960).
61. See, e.g., VIRGINIA HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 19
(1970); Benn, supra note 60, at 128-29 (“might not the ‘objective interests’ of a class mean
what might be reasonably demanded for it in its particular situation, irrespective of whether
it actually aspires to it itself?”). This possibility raises the problems of false consciousness
and adaptive preferences.
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outcome.62 Objective and subjectively adopted63 interests of the
right sort are thus necessary, but not sufficient, for deserving
constitutional rights.64
Otherwise put, having an interest in the relevant sense
means, at a very minimum, that some things may or may not
promote one’s good,65 one’s advantage in some meaningful way,66
or otherwise accrue to one’s meaningful benefit,67 perhaps in a
publicly-minded or socially responsible sense. One’s good,
advantage, or benefit may or may not rise above subjective
preference satisfaction into something like deep selfactualization, self-realization, self-fulfillment, or genuine
flourishing.68 But for some entity to be a candidate for
constitutional rights, some sufficient set of objective interests and
subjectively adopted interests must be in play, above and beyond
conscientiousness, self-consciousness, or sentience in
themselves.
An advanced robot, or some other entity, might qualify as
conscious, and even as self-conscious, with a capacity to describe,
respond to, or intervene in the environment. By themselves
62. See Held, supra note 61, at 28. One might thus have a strong objective interest
and a strong subjectively adopted interest in winning some award without thereby having
any sort of right to win the award. Having interests of the right sort makes one a “candidate”
for deserving rights, including constitutional rights. See R.G. Frey, Rights, Interests,
Desires, and Beliefs, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 233, 239 (1979).
63. The need for a capacity to subjectively recognize, to an appropriate degree, one’s
interests, narrowly or broadly understood, partly reflects the nature of constitutional and
some other forms of rights. In general, rights by their very nature can be variously exercised
in one way or another and may be exercised or waived. A constitutional right to vote, or to
speak, for example, thus typically requires some subjective attention to what one takes to be
one’s interests. For clarity, there may be a moral or legal duty, let us say, to not burn down
a forest. But this would not itself mean that the forest has a right not to be burned down.
One might conceivably say that a forest has some sort of objective interest in not being
burned down. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA PART II, qu. 94, art. 2 (Fathers
of the English Dominican Province trans., R. & T. Washbourne, Ltd. ed., 1915). But even if
we wish to say this, we would not thereby imply that the forest, or any individual tree, has
subjectively adopted, or could conceivably subjectively adopt, an interest in not being burned
down. Nor would it follow that the forest itself has a right of any sort to not be burned down
or to choose between being burned down and not being burned down.
64. See Held, supra note 61, at 28.
65. See, e.g., Christine Swanton, The Concept of Interests, 8 POLITICAL THEORY 83,
83 (1980).
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE ch. 2, at
46 (1974).
68. See id. at 61.
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though, these capacities do not imply a capacity for short or long
term plans, life-projects, goals, or aspirations.69 We might group
the latter capacities, broadly understood, under the rubric of
objective and subjectively adopted interests.
The lurking complication here is that the idea of “sentience”
seems to be ambiguous in this regard. We again have no quarrel
with any reasonable definition of “sentience,” or any other term.
But the ambiguities of “sentience” may straddle the line between
having interests and not having interests.70 If we take “sentient”
to mean, roughly, having use of something like the five human
senses or of being aware of one’s environment, then sentience
does not seem to imply that one has objective and subjectively
approved interests.71 But if we choose to define “sentience” so as
to necessarily include, say, the capacity to feel pain72 in a
69. KASPAROV, supra note 7, at 259 (referring to the capacity to have a genuine
purpose, or to dream, perhaps in the sense of aspiring).
70.
See,
e.g.,
Sentient,
OXFORD
ENG.
DICTIONARY
(2018),
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/176055?
[https://perma.cc/267M-Z2LC]
(indicating
ambiguity in the definition of “sentient”).
71. Very roughly, knowing all about something, perhaps largely through sentient
experience, and being able to interact with the environment in relevant ways do not establish
that the knower has even the slightest subjective desire to steer the course of events in any
direction. An advanced robot might not care in the slightest about raising its robot umbrella
to prevent rusting due to a rainstorm. The advanced robot might well be programmed to
raise its umbrella, but this need not imply having objective and subjectively approved
interests. In fact, even an advanced robot that has largely “programmed itself,” according to
relevant underlying or more basic programming, to raise its umbrella need not have an
interest in doing so, in the sense of a subjectively approved interest. A further capacity on
the part of the robot for genuine concern, dread, fear, or anxiety would be another matter.
72. See, e.g., Bruce MacLennan, Cruelty to Robots? The Hard Problem of Robot
Suffering
(2009),
http://www.iacap.org/proceedings_IACAP13/paper_9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BDU7-WDPY] (“it is by no means impossible that some future robots may
feel their emotions, that is, that they may have subjective emotional experiences
homologous, but not identical, to ours”). There may or may not be a meaningful difference
between subjectively feeling pain, dread, fear, or anxiety, and appearing to do so, based on
the advanced robot’s observable behavior. See, e.g., id.; Richard Fisher, Is It OK to Torture
or Murder a Robot? (November 27, 2013), www.bbc.com/future/story/20131127-wouldyou-murder-a-robot [https://perma.cc/73VW-M2P9]. One complication is that it might well
be morally wrong for humans to physically impair or damage their own machine, whatever
its capacities, if doing so would tend to more broadly desensitize the human to harming, or
would contribute to developing a destructive disposition or habit. See ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. II 34-40 (Terence Irwin 2d ed., Terence Irwin trans., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1999) (c. 384 B.C.E.). This is not to suggest that pain, or some near or distant
analogue thereto in an advanced robot, cannot have positive value for that robot or for others.
See Evan Ackerman, Researchers Teaching Robots to Feel and React to Pain, IEEE
SPECTRUM
(2016),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/robotics-
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genuinely subjectively experiential way, then the idea of
sentience at least opens the door73 to having objective and
subjectively approved interests.
The basic idea is that consciousness, self-consciousness, and
at least some forms of sentience do not also imply the presence of
objective and subjectively adopted interests sufficient to open the
possibility of deserved constitutional rights. An advanced robot’s
conscious knowledge, for example, that it may well be
permanently shut down, hardly opens up the possibility of a
deserved right not to be shut down if that robot lacks, for example,
any relevant plans or aspirations, let alone any associated
emotions. A deserved constitutional right generally requires this
form of interest, as well as a capacity to meaningfully and
subjectively care in some non-random, non-arbitrary, nonfleeting, structured way.74 In general, we cannot imagine a
deserving constitutional right-holder who lacks at all relevant
times the capacity to genuinely care about that right, its exercise
one way or another, its waiver, or its violation.
The idea of advanced robots thus allows us to see clearly the
essential linkage between deserving constitutional rights and
having objective and subjectively adopted interests.75 The further
lesson, then, has to do with the broader role of interests in
constitutional law. As it happens, a role for interest analysis in
constitutional law is already well-established.76 Oddly though,
constitutional reflection on interests is often largely confined to

software/researchers-teaching-robots-to-feel-and-react-to-pain
[https://perma.cc/8JPGRAQN].
73. It might be clearer that the advanced robot had the right sort of interests if the
capacity for pain or suffering itself were also accompanied by a capacity to fear or to dread
future pain, as well as the capacity to remember previous pain with genuine negative effect.
74. See Frey, supra note 62, at 239; see also supra note 11.
75. The idea of an interest is understood consistently with our examination of the
conceptual literature. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text. While subjectively
adopted interests are generally necessary for deserving a constitutional right, so are objective
interests. See supra note 63. A merely subjectively adopted interest completely detached
from, if not at odds with, any objective interest would not generally suffice. And to be
entitled to a constitutional right, the putative right-holder must be capable at some relevant
point of subjectively caring about the right, its exercise, waiver, or violation.
76. Consider the compelling governmental interest test applied in constitutional strict
scrutiny cases. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An
Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U.L. REV. 917, 918,
968 (1988).
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governmental or public interests.77 Ironically, the role of
interests, and of interest analysis, is often minimal to non-existent
with specific regard to putative rights-bearers.78 Our focus herein
on the conditions of deserving a constitutional right highlights the
curious judicial tendency to minimize explicit analysis of the
right-claimant’s own relevant interests or lack thereof.79 Often,
constitutional rights cases are treated as involving a conflict
between governmental or public interests on the one hand, and the
claimant’s rights or assertions thereof on the other, with the
claimant’s own interests being set aside or backgrounded.80
Consider, merely for example, the free speech case of Brown
v. Entertainment Merchants Association.81 As in many recent free
speech and other constitutional rights cases, the Court rejected a
relatively broad consideration of the claimant’s interests in favor
of a standard strict scrutiny focus on governmental and public
interests.82 In fact, the contest in Brown was between a strict
scrutiny test with no immediate or explicit focus on the claimant’s
speech interests83 and a rejected test that would have weighed the
social costs of the speech against the value of an entire category
or kind of speech.84
77. See R. George Wright, A Hard Look for Exacting Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L. REV.
207, 209-10, 219, 227, 230 (2016).
78. See Gottlieb, supra note 76, at 978.
79. This is not to deny that courts often take explicit account of a constitutional rightclaimant’s own interests, as in procedural due process cases on the nature and timing of a
hearing. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (using a three-part balancing
test considering the weight of the claimant’s interest). ’But see Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 578 (1972) (denying the relevance, for property interest
purposes, of the weight, as distinct from the nature, of the claimant’s interests).’ Justice
Breyer is probably the current, foremost American judicial advocate of a relatively broad
examination of affected interests in constitutional cases. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez,
567 U.S. 709, 730, 730-31 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring); ’see also Wright, supra note 77,
at 217 (discussing Justice Breyer’s constitutional proportionalism and related themes).
80. See generally, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2759, 2767 (2014);
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016).
81. 564 U.S. 786, 788 (2011).
82. See id. at 792, 799.
83. See id. at 799.
84. See id. at 792; United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (citing United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (affirming, but slightly altering the test
articulated in Stevens)). Kinds of speech in this context refer to something like libel,
obscenity, fighting words, or incitement to illegal acts. See id. at 719. This approach is
traceable to the “fighting words” case of Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
But even Chaplinksy refers not to the objective and subjectively adopted interests of the
speaker, but to the broader value of speech and the pursuit of truth more generally. See id. at

626

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:3

On either test, it is too easy to assume that the weight of the
claimant’s objective and subjectively approved interests will
somehow be accommodated.85 This need not be so. But the point
of our emphasizing the interests of the rights-claimant, or of
multiple rights-claimants, is not necessarily to suggest that those
interests tend to be underweighted in free speech cases. It would
certainly be possible to argue that in many cases, increased
attention to the objective and subjectively adopted interests of the
claimant could actually result in greater legal accommodation of
the governmental and other public interests.86 Explicit attention
to the relevant interests of the speakers may thus, sometimes
result in driving the constitutional weight of the speaker’s case
downward.87

III. AUTONOMY, AGENCY, PERSONHOOD, AND
THE QUESTION OF MATERIALISMAND
DESERVING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
At first glance, it would seem that much progress could be
made on questions of constitutional rights for advanced robots by
determining whether the robot should count as autonomous,88 as
572 (referring to broad categories of speech “of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.”).
85. The First Amendment’s text is often thought to reflect a final balancing and proper
accommodation of all relevant interests. See, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470. It seems fair to
say, however, that the actual constitutional case results do not typically fall neatly out of a
close reading of the First Amendment’s text.
86. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
(2016) (exploring some useful theory in a much broader context).
87. Consider, as mere possibilities, that the consumer interest in Brown was largely in
obtaining, as an adolescent, though sale or rental, as opposed to other sources, access to a
starkly limited class of especially violent video games that must be shown to be without
serious literary, scientific, artistic, or political value for such a consumer. See Brown, 564
U.S. at 789. Close to the essence of Stevens was the interstate marketing of so-called “animal
crush videos.” See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 465. (internal quotations omitted). Alvarez ultimately
involved respondent’s deliberate lie that he had earned a distinguished military medal. See,
e.g., Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709. Additionally, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,
560 (1991), a free speech case in which the primary speaker, as distinct from the lounge
owner, was speaking in the form of commercial barroom nude dancing where no message
was intended by the dancer, her motivation instead being to make more money. See Barnes,
at 563. The weight of these interests, for purposes of free speech right adjudication, might
actually cut against recognizing strongly protected constitutional rights.
88. The importance of autonomy is most conspicuous in the work of the philosopher
Immanuel Kant, but is easily traceable to the work of Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola. See
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capable of agency,89 or as a person.90 The crucial problem here is
that the ideas of autonomy, agency, and personhood have long
been used in what we might call thicker and thinner, or in deeper
and shallower, senses.91 As robot capacities develop, autonomy,
agency, and personhood can be ascribed to robots at least in some
thin or shallow senses of the terms.92 The important error to avoid
GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 5 (Charles Glenn Wallis
trans., 1965) (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1998) (1486) (“[n]either heavenly nor
earthly . . . have [w]e made thee. Thou . . . art the molder and maker of thyself; thou mayest
sculpt thyself into whatever shape thou dost prefer”). “ . . . . . .”See also ISAIAH BERLIN,
TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY, IN LIBERTY 166, 179-83 (Henry Hardy ed., Oxford University
Press 2002) (1969); MURRAY SHANAHAN, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY 183 (MIT
Press 2015); R. Alami, et al., An Architecture for Autonomy, 17 INT. J. ROBOTICS RES. 315
(1998); Gianmarco Veruggio, et al., Roboethics: Ethics Applied to Robotics, 18 IIEE
ROBOTICS AND AUTOMATION MAG. 21, 22 (March 2011). A linkage between at least some
forms of autonomy and some forms of personhood is officially made in EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RULES ON ROBOTICS p. 6, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-0005+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN
[https://perma.cc/V4KT-SJCY] (Jan. 27, 2017).
89. See, e.g., JERRY KAPLAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 106 (2016); WENDELL
WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG
16 (Oxford University Press 2010); Brian Talbot, Ryan Jenkins & Duncan Purves, When
Robots Should Do the Wrong Thing, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: FROM AUTONOMOUS CARS TO
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 258, 258 (Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins eds., Oxford
University Press 2017).
90. See CHRISTIAN SMITH, WHAT IS A PERSON?: RETHINKING HUMANITY, SOCIAL
LIFE, AND THE MORAL GOOD FROM THE PERSON UP 16 (2011); ROBERT SPAEMANN,
PERSONS: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘SOMEONE’ AND ‘SOMETHING’ 2 (Oliver
O’Donovan trans., 2017) (1996)‘’‘’’; Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CAL. L.
REV. CIR. 45, 57 (June 2015) (“[p]eople may treat the robot as a person (or animal) for some
purposes and as an object for others.”); Alexis Dyschkant, Legal Personhood: How We Are
Getting It Wrong, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 2075, 2076-77; Douglas Lind, Pragmatism and
Anthropomorphism: Reconceiving the Doctrine of the Personality of the Ship, 22 U. S.F.
MAR. L.J. 39, 40-42 (2010) (discussing the pragmatic, as opposed to deserved,
personification of and the ascription of certain limited rights to ships under admiralty law);
Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283, 287 (1927) (“[t]he master of the vessel
appears in court to represent the ship and the ship vindicates the rights or makes a vicarious
atonement for the wrongs of its owner.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood and
Artificial Intelligence, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1286 (1992) (distinguishing ordinary corporate
personhood and concluding that “[i]f AIs behaved the right way and if cognitive science
confirmed that the underlying processes producing these behaviors were relatively similar to
the processes of the human mind, we would have very good ground to treat AIs as persons.”);
James Vincent, Giving Robots ‘Personhood’ Is Actually About Making Corporations
Accountable, THE VERGE, www.theverge.com/2017/1/19/14322334/robot-electronicpersons-eu-report [ (January 9, 2017).
91. See supra notes 88-90 (showing examples of both shallower and deeper
understandings of autonomy, agency, and personhood).
92. Id.
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is assuming without argument that being autonomous, an agent,
or a person in merely some shallow sense suffices for deserving
constitutional rights, or else assuming, again without argument,
that differences among shallow and deep senses of autonomy,
agency, and personhood do not exist or simply do not matter.
In a shallow or minimalist sense then, we might refer to a
driverless car as an autonomous vehicle. Autonomy in this
shallow sense may mean simply that the advanced robot in
question responds well to environmental changes without realtime external human intervention, beyond its initial
programming.93 Historically though, there have also been
understandings of autonomy requiring more and different
capabilities.94 Thus for Immanuel Kant, genuine freedom and
autonomy require the capacity to overcome empirical causation
or, at a minimum, one’s own desires and appetites.95 Here, we
might add an advanced robot’s programming, however
paradoxically, to that which the robot would have to be able to
overcome in order to have autonomy in Kant’s full sense.

93. See, e.g., SHANAHAN, supra note 88, at 183 (autonomous AI as “able to act without
human intervention.”); EU COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 88, at p. 6 (“a
robot’s autonomy can be defined as the ability to take decisions and implement them in the
outside world, independently of external control or influence . . . .”); R. Alami, et al., supra
note 88, at 315 (“[a]utonomy and adaptability” as requiring that “the robot be able to carry
out its actions, and refine or modify the task and its own behavior according to the current
goal and execution context as these are perceived.”).
94. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 114 (H. J. Paton trans., Hutchinson & Co. 1961) (1785) (requiring
for freedom or autonomy, a sort of causation by reason as distinct from any physical or
biological causation). See also THOMAS E. HILL, JR., AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 29
(1991); ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 52 (1989); ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL
THEORY 46 (1989); ’CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 25
(1996).
95. See KANT, supra note 94, at 114; BERLIN, supra note 88, at 183. Of inspiration
to Kant was Rousseau’s crucial claim that “the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while
obedience to a [self-prescribed law] is liberty.” See Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social
Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 19 (G.D.H. Cole trans., E.P. Dutton
& Co. 1950) (1762). If we analogize one’s desires to a portion or all of an advanced robot’s
programming, then to be a deeply autonomous robot, on Rousseau’s understanding, the robot
would have to be capable of obeying a self-prescribed law—perhaps via its own somehow
independently generated programming. This capability would contrast with the robot’s
merely conforming to its “appetites” as analogized perhaps to its past and current
programming.
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The idea of agency could be analyzed in similar fashion.96 A
shallow or thin sense of agency can track a thin sense of
autonomy. Thus an “autonomous” highway vehicle might
correspondingly be said to display a kind of “agency” in slowing
down due to a sudden rain or the darting of an animal.97 But it is
also commonly held that moral agency requires, at a minimum,
consciousness.98 And more stringently, it has also been argued
that moral agency in an advanced robot would require “a
conscience and freedom to choose its own actions on the basis of
a full comprehension of their implications and consequences.”99
Understandably, theories of agency that require more in terms of
agent capacity tend to be relatively skeptical as to near-term robot
agency.100
A somewhat similar story can more readily be told with
regard to legal, if not moral, personhood.101 Among other entities,
ships and corporations have long been regarded as legal persons,
at least in a thin or shallow sense of the idea of personhood.102
But a combination of legal and moral personhood may, on some
theories, require capacities not historically possessed by sailing
ships, or even by sophisticated programs.103 Thus the sociologist
Christian Smith sees “reflexivity, self-transcendence, selfidentity, morality, causal self-direction, communion, [and]
responsibility[]”104 as exclusive to persons.105
96. An ambitious or full sense of “autonomy” tracks that of a full sense of ‘agency.”
See Stephen Darwall, The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will, 116 U. CHI. ETHICS
J. 263, 281-82 (Jan. 2006).
97. For a discussion of a computer program’s possible agency in at least a thin or
shallow sense, see KAPLAN, supra note 89, at 106 (“[t]here’s nothing that requires a moral
agent to ‘feel’ anything about right or wrong. . . .”).
98. See, e.g., WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 89, at 63 (moral agency as “seldom
attributed to individuals who do not understand or are not conscious of what they are
doing. . . .”).
99. Veruggio et al., supra note 88, at 22.
100. See, e.g., TALBOT ET AL., supra note 89, at 258-59.
101. On legal personhood, see Dyschkant, supra note 90, at 2075-78. For more
background, see generally THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS (Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed.,
1976).
102. See Lind, supra note 90, at 40-42; Bryant Smith, supra note 90, at 288; Solum,
supra note 90, at 1286.
103. See supra note 102 and accompanying sources.
104. CHRISTIAN SMITH, supra note 90, at 88-89.
105. See SPAEMANN, supra note 90, at 248 (explaining that living beings with “an
inner life of sentience” and a typical capacity for rationality and “self-awareness” falls within
the class of persons—explicitly including porpoises).
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Thus, the path is admittedly open to adopt thin, shallow,
undemanding understandings of the ideas of autonomy, agency,
and personhood, and on this basis, to conclude that many sorts of
advanced robots can deserve or be entitled to various
constitutional rights on the merits.106 We might have pragmatic
or moral reasons for doing so. But there are also substantial risks
in setting aside fuller and deeper conceptions of autonomy,
agency, and personhood. And there are associated risks with
extending constitutional rights, as somehow sufficiently merited
or appropriate, on the basis of thin or shallow conceptions.107
This is not to suggest that what we have referred to as thin
or shallow conceptions of autonomy, agency, and personhood are
not currently fashionable, or even dominant, among the experts.
Such thin conceptions are commonly held today on the basis of
what we might call, merely for convenience, one form or another
of materialism.108 Judgments as to the merits of materialist
accounts of conscious subjectivity, of a continuing and somehow
not entirely material self, or of a self-consciousness that is not
entirely reducible to the physical realm, have long and sharply
differed.109 Today, materialist accounts of consciousness, selfconsciousness, and of mind are widely,110 though not
106. See supra notes 88-90.
107. See supra Section III and accompanying text.
108. See generally William Ramsey, Eliminative Materialism, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
(last
updated
Apr.
16,
2013),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative [https://perma.cc/DNP8-2BQC].
See also Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (last
updated
Mar.
9,
2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism
[https://perma.cc/9WJM-FZCD]; J. J. C. Smart, The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
(last
updated
May
18,
2007),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity [https://perma.cc/355B-662F]; Michael Tye,
Qualia, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (last updated Dec. 18, 2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia [https://perma.cc/RZX4-TBTK].
109. See, e.g., A. P. MARTINICH, HOBBES 25, 42 (2005); Michael LeBuffe, Paul-Henri
Thiry (Baron) d’Holbach § 2, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (last updated Oct.
22, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/holbach.’ (discussing the materialism of Hobbes
and Holbach respectively). See also Julien Offray de la Mettrie, Man a Machine, in THE
PORTABLE ENLIGHTENMENT READER 202-03 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1995) (1747). But see,
Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, in DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS 27
(Laurence J. Lafleur trans., 1960) (1637) (“I had already recognized very clearly that
intelligent nature is distinct from corporeal nature . . . .”); Id. at 44 (“our soul is by nature
entirely independent of the body . . . .”).
110. See THOMAS NAGEL, MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEODARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF NATURE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE 4 (Oxford University
Press 2012). See also supra note 109; Daniel Dennett, Consciousness in Human and Robot
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universally,111 popular. So it is not surprising that thin or shallow
understandings of autonomy, agency, and personhood apparently
compatible with materialism, are similarly popular.
Materialist views of consciousness and of thin or shallow
forms of autonomy, agency, and personhood, require a
reassessment of our casually assumed folk psychology. The
initial implications of these materialist views can be starkly
expressed:
We can ignore the evidence and philosophical difficulties,
hang on to the way our precious self feels, and believe in a
soul or spirit[.] Alternatively, we can try to live with the
knowledge that self is an illusion, accepting that every time
‘I’ seem to exist, this is just a temporary fiction. . . . . This is
tough, but I think it gets easier with practice.112

If we accept a materialist view of the conscious self, and of
autonomy, agency, and personhood, we can certainly try to
address questions of advanced robot constitutional rights on that
basis. We could then argue that if subjective experience and
related phenomena are just a persistent and powerful illusion in
human beings,113 a robot otherwise qualifying for a constitutional
right would, as a matter of logic and equality, only have to be
capable of experiencing the same or at least relevantly similar
illusions.
That is, an otherwise qualified advanced robot might
imagine that it possesses self-consciousness, along with
autonomy, agency, and personhood in the fullest and deepest
senses.114 And this belief might be critically judged to be false, or
Minds, IIAS SYMPOSIUM ON COGNITION, COMPUTATION AND CONSCIOUSNESS (Sept. 3,
1994), https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/concrobt.htm [https://perma.cc/2YVBM4B6].
111. See, e.g., NAGEL, supra note 110, at 4-5; Laurence BonJour, Against
Materialism, in THE WANING OF MATERIALISM 3 (Robert C. Koons & George Bealer eds.,
2010) (noting also the recent dominance of materialist views of mind).
112. SUSAN BLACKMORE, CONSCIOUSNESS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 82 (2d
ed. 2017); One aspect of an alternative view suggests that rejecting, reducing, or explaining
away subjective conscious experience “does not explain the distinction between 0.000075
centimeter electromagnetic radiation and my experience of redness.” RAY KURZWEIL, THE
AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 59
(1999).
113. See Blackmore, supra note 112, at 82-83; BRUCE HOOD, THE SELF ILLUSION:
HOW THE SOCIAL BRAIN CREATES IDENTITY, at IX (2012).
114. See supra note 93.
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in any number of senses, an illusion.115 But in these respects, the
critical judgments of falsity and illusion might well place the
advanced robots in circumstances relatively similar to those of
comparatively deluded human beings. Human beings may
undisputedly bear constitutional rights.116 Thus it would follow
that otherwise qualified robots could merit constitutional rights,
even if subjective self-consciousness and other related ideas are
delusional and the only viable senses of autonomy, agency, and
personhood are quite thin, shallow, and otherwise limited.117 Any
other approach under these crucial assumptions would seem to
involve arbitrary anti-robot discrimination.
However, a problem lurks in the decision to accord deserved
constitutional rights to anyone, human or robotic, for whom
subjective conscious experience, an experience of the self,
autonomy, agency, and personhood can be applied only in the
shallowest senses, if at all. We can admittedly imagine a scenario
in which according a variety of constitutional rights to machines
has, over some time frame, desired consequences. But we should
also consider the broader implications of such a lax approach over
the longer term.
Suppose, more concretely, that we choose to confer a broad
range of constitutional rights on humans and non-humans that we
believe to be ultimately reducible to something like a mere
“arrangements of brain cells,”118 the robotic analogue thereof, to
“physical blobs,”119 “chemical scum,”120 “a bag of chemicals,”121

115. Compare sources cited supra note 113 with MARY MIDGLEY, ARE YOU AN
ILLUSION? 1-4 (2014).
116. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1972) (discussing due process
requirements when a person’s constitutional right is at stake).
117. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 804-05 (2010) (extending
First Amendment rights to minors, though they are not considered to be completely
developed and autonomous).
118. Midgley, supra note 115, at vii.
119. VALERIE TIBERIUS, MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION
16 (2015).
120. DAVID DEUTSCH, THE FABRIC OF REALITY: THE SCIENCE OF PARALLEL
UNIVERSES—AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 177 (1997) (quoting the renowned Professor Stephen
Hawking).—
121. Anthony R. Cashmore, The Lucretian Swerve: The Biological Basis of Human
Behavior and the Criminal Justice System, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 4499, 4504
(2010). ’
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“a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules,”122
or “complex biological machines,”123 with capacities that rise no
higher than what we would normally ascribe to such entities.124
It is at this point important to remember that constitutional
rights, no less than other sorts of rights, are crucially intended to
hold when considerations of pains and pleasures, other forms of
welfare and utility, or of real harms and benefits point against
upholding the constitutional right in question.125 Rights, as
Professor Ronald Dworkin has famously observed, are intended
to trump such considerations.126
Over the long term and once we have fully adjusted to belief
in, at best, quite thin, if not ultimately vacuous, understandings of
consciousness and related phenomena, we might begin to wonder
why we should continually suffer entirely avoidable net pain and
discomfort for the sake of more or less arbitrarily assigned rights
granted to merely material entities. Why, even more concisely,
should we sacrifice in the form of avoidable net suffering where
our science and metaphysics offer us no sufficient grounding for
doing so?
In sum, granting constitutional rights to machines however
technically sophisticated may, on typical materialist assumptions,
work reasonably well only until we, as a culture, have had time to
fully process and internalize the implications of those materialist
assumptions. We might then decline to further engage in
whatever net sacrifices are required by upholding a range of
122. FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR
(1995).
123. Joshua D. Greene, Social Neuroscience and the Soul’s Last Stand, in SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SOCIAL MIND
263, 264 (Alexander Todorov et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011).’
124. See generally R. George Wright, Criminal Law and Sentencing: What Goes With
Free Will?, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 4-8 (2013); R. George Wright, Pulling On the Thread of
the Insanity Defense, 59 VILL. L. REV. 221, 226-33 (2013); R. George Wright, Legal
Paternalism and the Eclipse of Principle, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 194, 212-14 (2017).
125. Thus the Court upholds free speech rights as exercised in connection with
military funerals by the Westboro Baptist Church without inquiring whether at least in this
and similar cases, any balancing of interests, sentiments, or welfare actually recommends
such a course. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458-61 (2011).
126. See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 152, 164
(Jeremy Waldron ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1984); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY xi, 364 (Harvard Univ. Press 1978); see also UTILITY AND RIGHTS 8-9 (R.G.
Frey ed., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984); H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 828, 829 (1979) (discussing John Rawls’s approach, among others).
THE SOUL 3
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constitutional rights for advanced robots. But crucially, if we
determined that according such rights to robots is arbitrary and
unnecessarily sacrificial and that human beings, on our materialist
views, are actually similarly situated, the constitutional rights of
humans would be no less imperiled.127
After all, it is not entirely clear that humans, if they are
indeed reducible to anything like “chemical scum,”128 can even
have genuinely meaningful interests as a prerequisite to rights.129
Significant sacrifice on behalf of some conception of the “rights”
of anything reducible to a chemical scum would seem arbitrary.

IV. SOME OBSERVATIONS IN THE REALM OF
SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Having considered broad questions associated with the
possibility of advanced robots deserving a range of constitutional
rights, we now briefly consider robot constitutional rights
questions at the level of specific rights. This tour will, of obvious
necessity, be highly selective. Many different constitutional
rights might be claimable by or on behalf of advanced robots.130
But it is obviously difficult to deny the importance and centrality
of the equal protection rights of persons, and so we begin with
reference thereto.
In this regard, focusing on the idea of equality itself does not
take us very far. The idea of equality centers on access to, or
distribution of, benefits and harms on relevant criteria.131 If we
are to meaningfully address issues of robot equality,132 and in
particular of robot equal protection, we would have to somehow
127. See, e.g., Hart supra note 126, at 829-31 (discussing how individual sacrifice is
necessary for greater happiness, though that individual may not experience the greater sum
of happiness).
128. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Section II.
130. See Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and
Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1171-74, 1180 (2016) (discussing the
foundations for extending First Amendment rights to artificial intelligence).
131. See generally IWAO HIROSE, EGALITARIANISM 1-11 (2015); Kenneth W. Simons,
The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693, 696 (2000). For a sense of the range
and variety in important respects of egalitarian theory, see R. George Wright, Equal
Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2016).
132. See COLIN MCGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A
MATERIAL WORLD 177 (1999) (raising issues of robot equality and other potential robot
rights, without attempted resolution).
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settle upon answers to some basic questions. In order to qualify
for equal protection rights, advanced robots would have to qualify
as “persons” in the relevant constitutional sense.133 And there are,
as we have seen,134 distinct senses of “person” or personhood in
some but not all of which senses advanced robots might qualify
as “persons.”135 There would then be the question of whether and
if the senses in which a robot might qualify as a person correspond
to the sense of “person” embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment.136
At some point we would have to confront the question of the
relevant grounds or bases in virtue of which an advanced robot
would be judged to be the constitutional equal of human persons.
Historically, there have been many attempts to identify the
grounds on which persons should be treated by the law as
equals.137 Whether any of these proffered grounds are satisfactory
in the case of human beings, and whether these grounds can be
usefully deployed in cases of advanced robots, is controversial.138

133. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99
(1954) (in the federal legal context). Even more fundamentally, personhood and elemental
equality are at the heart of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of slavery and involuntary
servitude. See generally Baher Azmy, Unshackling The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern
Slavery and a Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1060-61
(2002); William M. Carter, Jr., The Promises of Freedom: The Contemporary Relevance of
the Thirteenth Amendment, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 867, 870 (2013) (slavery as “an evolving
matrix of subordination”); Jamal Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1733, 1733 (2012); George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, the Power of
Congress, and the Shifting Sources of Civil Rights Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 1551
(2012) (discussing expansive versus restrictive interpretations of the Thirteenth
Amendment); Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1337, 1361-62 (2009); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 256 (2010) (explaining Congress’s antisubordination approach to its own enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment).
134. See supra Section III.
135. See id.
136. Philip Bump, You’re Worried About Trump? In 100 Years, Robots Might be
Running
for
President,
Washington
Post
(Dec.
15,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/10/can-a-robot-run-forpresident-seriously/? [https://perma.cc/6XUU-JQUK]. A final question might be whether
the minimum requirements for being a Fourteenth Amendment person night vary according
to context.
137. For an excellent contemporary survey and critique of such grounds, see generally
JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 1-3
(2017’).
138. See id. at 2.
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Thus attempts have been made to ground equality, or equal
rights, on sufficiently similar DNA,139 partly religious grounds,140
the capacity to feel pain or to in some sense suffer,141 actual or
potential reasoning ability,142 ability to articulate or think in
language,143 capacity to rise above material causal influences,144
ability to consciously live our lives from the inside out and over
time,145 a more or less equal vulnerability to be killed by one or
more other persons,146 shared individuality,147 or on some apt
combination of a variety of properties.148
As suggested above,149 whether an advanced robot could
qualify as the equal of an acknowledged person, or simply as a
person, for equal protection purposes will depend not only on our
choice among these criteria, but on how we choose to
define¾stringently or laxly¾the key concepts involved. A
sophisticated robot might be, say, conscious150 and perhaps
arguably a person entitled to equal protection on some definitions
but not others.151
The key point to emphasize though, is that if, in a spirit of
generosity or indulgence, we adopt a broadly inclusive definition
of consciousness, the self, autonomy, agency, or personhood we
may thereby unwittingly be creating for ourselves major longterm problems of arbitrariness and motivation, as noted above.152
139. See id. at 87.
140. See the argument in JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE
EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A WESTERN INSIGHT 152 (1999).
141. See WALDRON, supra note 137, at 89. Relatedly, we might also think of the
capacity to anticipate, or to recollect, subjective feelings of joy or pain and perhaps thereby
to actually engage such feelings.
142. See id. at 94-95.
143. See id. at 96 (citing GEORGE KETAB, HUMAN DIGNITY 138 (2011)).
144. See WALDRON, supra note 137, at 100-01. But see Bernard Williams, The Idea
of Equality, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 122 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1971) (expressing
skepticism in this respect).
145. See WALDRON, supra note 137, at 107, 122-23; GEORGE SHER, EQUALITY FOR
INEGALITARIANS 79 (2014) (focusing on conscious subjectivity).
146. See WALDRON, supra note 137, at 121 (discussing the Hobbesian state of nature).
147. Geoffrey Cupit, The Basis of Equality, 75 J. OF THE ROYAL INST. OF PHIL. 105,
116 (2000).
148. See WALDRON, supra note 137, at 126-27. See also Ian Carter, Respect and The
Basis of Equality, 121 U. CHI. ETHICS J. 538, 539 (2011).
149. See supra Section III.
150. See supra Section II.
151. See id.
152. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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More positively, for robot equal protection advocates, is that
there may be no need to show that a particular robot is the equal
of human persons in some specific capacity in order to qualify for
equal protection. This paradox reflects the possibility that the
property required to qualify as a constitutional person may be, as
the term has it, a “range property.”153 The basic idea of a range
property is that for some purposes, two entities can both count as
persons and in that sense as equals even if they do not score
equally high on some crucial criterion, as long as they both score
sufficiently high on that criterion.154 Thus advanced robots might
score higher, equally high, or lower than human beings on a
supposed criterion of, for example, intelligence, and still qualify
as persons for equal protection purposes as long as their
intelligence is above some appropriate threshold.155
Equal protection of the laws, of course, can arise as a key
issue in many social and cultural contexts.156 Many such contexts
may be remote from the nature, capacities, activities, and interests
of advanced robots. Others will be directly relevant.157 The
specific contexts in which the questions of equal protection of
advanced robots may arise can be usefully explored through
considering the equality dimensions of other distinct possible
constitutional rights of advanced robots, to several of which rights
we now briefly attend.
Equality and voting rights, for example, are typically
inseparable.158 An advanced robot with, among other qualities,
both objective and subjectively adopted interests159 would likely
153. See WALDRON, supra note 137, at 118-19; SHER, supra note 145, at 77; JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 508 (1971).
154. See WALDRON, supra note 137, at 118-19; SHER, supra note 145, at 77; See
RAWLS, supra note 153, at 508.
155. John Rawls notes that all the points inside a circle are equal to one another in
being somewhere inside the circle as opposed to outside the circle, even though some points
inside the circle are closer than others to the circumference of the circle. See RAWLS, supra
note 153, at 508.
156. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 465-718 (8th ed.
2018).
157. Coby McDonald, The Good, the Bad, and the Robot: Experts Are Trying to Make
Machines
Be
“Moral,”
CAL.
MAG.
(June
4,
2015,
12:37
PM),
https://alumni.berkeley.edu/california-magazine/just-in/2015-06-08/good-bad-and-robotexperts-are-trying-make-machines-be-moral [https://perma.cc/G6JQ-JFFR].
158. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1962); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 58, 75-76 (1980); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993).
159. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
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have a further interest in voting160 in order to protect those
interests. As the Supreme Court has understandably claimed, the
constitutional right to vote is instrumentally important.161 Voting
is said to be “preservative of other basic civil and political
rights. . . .”162 So at the very least, when the franchise is arbitrarily
restricted, special judicial scrutiny of legislation disfavoring the
arbitrarily excluded group may be appropriate.163
Of course, someone might argue that no voting rights need
be extended to even the most qualified and somehow
independent-minded robot, on the grounds that the interests of
such robots will typically be protected by human voters who help
produce, utilize, or otherwise benefit from such robots. This
would, however, remind us of the disturbing historical argument
against the practical value of extending the franchise to women.164
More uniquely, voting rights for robots would raise
questions of the relation between voting rights for all qualified
persons and what might be called reproduction, propagation, or
replication.165 Human beings do not typically reproduce for the
purpose of voting, or affecting the outcome of elections.166
160. Presumably at several jurisdictional levels.
161. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (quoting Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
162. Id. One could sensibly argue that if voting operates to protect one’s interests and
rights, so also might freedom of speech, along with the freedom to actually, or virtually,
assemble in order to petition for redress of grievances. See infra notes 167-180 and
accompanying text (discussing speech rights for advanced robots).
163. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal
Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 219-20 (1991). Whether robots, or advanced robots, can
count as historically disfavored or marginalized may be either unanswerable or irrelevant.
See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985)
(discussing the relation between the scope of voting rights and political legitimacy).
164. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 948 (2002); Adam Winkler, A
Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the “Living Constitution”, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1456, 1457-58 (2001).
165. The Ethics of AI: Should Robots Be Allowed to Vote?, CHIPIN,
www.chipin.com/ethics-ai-should-robots-vote [https://perma.cc/C7XT-K5G3] (last visited
Sept. 22, 2018).
166. Cf. Drew Desilver, U.S. Trails Most Developed Countries in Voter Turnout, PEW
RES. CTR. (May 21, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/21/u-s-voterturnout-trails-most-developed-countries/[ [https://perma.cc/S3AY-RUCM] (showing no
present suggestion of an increase in U.S. voter population partially due to purposeful
reproduction); Thom File, Voting in America: A Look at the 2016 Presidential Election,
CENSUS BLOGS (May 10, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/randomsamplings/2017/05/voting_in_america.html [https://perma.cc/7RG2-MXNA].
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Individual persons do not, as voters, typically affect elections.167
Human reproduction for the purpose of affecting elections would,
at a minimum, involve an eighteen year lag period before any
fruition.168
In the case of advanced robots, or related physical entities,
however, these familiar constraints could largely evaporate.
Dramatically put, if an enfranchised robot can, at a modest cost,
make enormous numbers of copies of itself, how many additional
voters, if any, should be recognized? Millions of more or less
identical robots would in a sense have the same voting
qualifications as their voting progenitor. But granting all of these
equally well-qualified robots the right to vote might largely
undermine the meaningfulness and legitimacy of the voting
process.169 Would it make a difference if the millions of secondgeneration170 robots were somehow objectively or subjectively
distinct from their progenitor, perhaps through adapting their own
programming based on their own unique experiences?171
The answer to some of these questions might depend upon
whether, as in the case of human persons,172 the processes by
which advanced robots reproduce could reasonably be said to
involve meaningful privacy interests. But even if no such privacy
interests arise in the processes of robotic reproduction, some
interest-based and practical issues would remain.173

167. See, e.g., ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 62-89 (2013).
168. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
169. There could be cases in which one immense robot voting “faction”
counterbalances, and largely cancels the influence of, another robot voting faction. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the classic theory in a non-robotic
context). We set aside the question of self-perpetuating “arms races” in generating immense
numbers of politically opposed robot factions.
170. Or, presumably thereafter, as even today’s computer devices are supplanted by
new, upgraded generations within several years.
171. See, e.g., TEGMARK, supra note 23, at 109; McDonald, supra note 157; The
Ethics of AI: Should Robots Be Allowed to Vote?, supra note 165.
172. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (classic contraceptive
privacy case).
173. Consider, more concretely, how many votes should be allocated to the Borg
Collective. Should there be one vote only on the view that the Borg are, or is, a “hive” mind?
Or are there instead potential differences of objective and subjectively adopted interests
among those entities that make up the Borg Collective? See generally Borg Collective,
MEMORY ALPHA, https://memory-alpha.wiki.com/wiki/Borg_Collective (last visited Feb. 2,
2018).“”
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More manageably, voting rights for advanced robots would
raise questions of citizenship, residence, and age.174 In particular,
persons are typically not permitted to vote if they are less than 18
years old.175 A human person at age seven is thought to be less
competent to vote, in general, than the “same”176 person at age 27.
But these familiar understandings are irrelevant, if not grossly
misleading, in cases of advanced robots. An advanced robot
might be most capable of responsible voting soon after “‘birth,”‘
and might then obsolesce. Or an advanced robot might gradually
increase in voting competence, reaching a maximum well before
18 years have passed. Perhaps the debates over such matters
might inform, and in turn be informed by, our best thinking as to
whether the minimum age to serve as President,177 or in some
other official capacity,178 should be thought of entirely in
chronological terms, or whether some concern for the value of
accumulated experience or wisdom is also appropriate.179
The question of a robot’s constitutional right to serve on a
petit jury as a “peer”180 of, say, a human criminal defendant raises
both overlapping and distinctive issues. We can imagine a
potentially immensely helpful robot juror trier of fact, at least if
the robot juror scrupulously follows the court’s jury instructions
174. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969).
175. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (reflecting on the duration of geographic
residence in a jurisdiction by an advanced robot might helpfully provoke us to rethink
durational residency requirements for voting in an era of near-instantaneous information
exchange). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 332-33 (1972) (describing old
assumptions).
176. These judgments implicate questions of continuity, or lack of sustained
continuity, of identity among robots. There might also arise interesting issues of determining
when, for voting purposes, an advanced robot was “‘born’” or otherwise created.
177. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. see also Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles,
24 Const. Comment. 405, 412 (2007); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity:
Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221, 2224 (2015); Clarence
Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996). Of some interest as well would be the
capacity of some robots to genuinely and meaningfully undertake an “oath” of office, as
perhaps distinct from wiring or re-wiring itself to carry out certain tasks. To concede that a
particular robot is capable of genuinely taking an oath is to concede much of what would
often be thought to be necessary for personhood.
178. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (minimum age of Senators).
179. See sources cited supra note 177.
180. See generally Robert C. Walters, Michael D. Marin & Mark Curriden, Jury of
Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 319-24 (2005).
Query whether jurors or litigants would think of advanced robots as their “‘peers,” in the
sense of being of their own general “rank” or “station.”
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and perhaps special jury instructions tailored to address the
robot’s distinctive capacities.181 Or perhaps in scrupulously
following the juror instructions, a robot juror might expose for the
rest of us the fact that typical jury instructions are imperfect, or
are best taken with a proverbial grain of salt and are best only
partially complied with. Jury deliberations including an advanced
robot might involve something akin to human jurors having
immediate access to the internet.182 Some persons might be
troubled by perceived disproportionate influence of an advanced
robot on jury deliberations.183 Whether a robot could be subject
to peremptory challenge on the basis of robot-status could then be
litigated.
The peremptory juror challenge issue regarding advanced
robots seems especially open to debate. Even in civil cases,
discrimination on a basis such as the race of a potential juror is
generally prohibited.184 Should advanced robot-status count as
somehow sufficiently analogous to race, or would a difference in
species be more apt? Equal protection challenges have also been
upheld in cases of excluding a potential juror on the basis of
gender,185 sexual orientation,186 and religious belief.187
But in contrast, striking a potential juror on the basis of
blindness188 or particular employment189 has been judicially
upheld. Could a particular robot otherwise qualify for jury
181. Imagine a human juror in a death penalty case asking an advanced robot fellow
juror to recite verbatim every authoritative Scriptural passage bearing upon murder or a
penalty of death. See generally R. George Wright, Epistemic Peerhood in the Law, 91 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 663, 663 (2017).
182. Consider the attempted distinction between prohibiting writings in the jury
deliberation room, or consulting books therein, and allowing the individual juror’s “training”
to play a legitimate role in jury deliberations. See People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388, 425 (Cal.
1992).
183. Individual influence as a juror tends to correlate with, among other factors, the
level of formal education of the juror. See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE
STATE OF THE SCIENCE 166, 166 (2012).
184. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628-29 (1991).
185. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1994); United States
v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2010).
186. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 485 (9th Cir.
2014).
187. See Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 829 (Ind. 2006).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 483 F.3d 828, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (challenges
of blind juror upheld on rational basis review).
189. See Looney v. Davis, 721 So. 2d 152, 166 (Ala. 1998) (particular employment as
a permissible basis for peremptory challenges were relevant).
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service, but be peremptorily stricken or stricken for cause, on a
basis such as insufficient empathy or insufficient capacity for
compassion?190 Would the views of advanced robots be subject
to impermissible stereotyping?191 Or is there potentially wisdom
in a concern that robots of even immense sophistication in some
respects may lack inarticulate “tacit knowledge”192 that is
sometimes necessary for the best decisional outcome?
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from
reflecting on these matters is to appreciate the distinctive
contributions to the quality of jury deliberations that can flow
from legitimizing and validating the wide range of backgrounds
of potential jurors.193 Taking seriously the contributions of many
jurors with diverse, conflicting, or incommensurable experiences
and values tends, in practice, to enhance the quality of the jury
deliberative process and outcome.194
Also important is that the idea of sophisticated robot jurors
illustrates the untenable nature of our current law of permissible
and impermissible influences on jury deliberations. Imagine an
advanced robot juror with encyclopedic knowledge of virtually
everything relevant to any litigated case, including,
controversially,195 the ability to recite the references in every
religious text on the subject of any crime, tort, or punishment.
Current law attempts to distinguish between “external” influences
on juries, which may be presumptively improper, and “internal”
influences on juries, which are not.196 But nothing the robot juror
knows is external to the deliberation, and the robot may be, not
190. Id.
191. See Martinez, 621 F.3d at 107.
192. See generally MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (rev. ed. 2009).
193. Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice, and Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659,
663 (2002).
194. See Devine supra note 183, at 165; Marder supra note 193, at 663; Dennis J.
Devine, et al., Deliberation Quality: A Preliminary Examination in Criminal Juries, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 273, 276 (2007); Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury
Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593, 596 (1987).
195. See generally Monica K. Miller, et al., Bibles in the Jury Room: Psychological
Theories Question Judicial Assumptions, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 579, 579-88 (2013).
196. Among the many cases attempting to rely on this “internal” versus “external”
influence distinction see, e.g., Perkins v. State, 144 So. 3d 457, 496 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002);
Young v. State, 12 P.3d 20, 49 (Okla. 2000). For the broader underlying theory of this
attempted distinction see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987); Robinson v.
Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 362 (4th Cir. 2006); Oliver v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 329, 336 (5th Cir.
2008).
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only immensely knowledgeable, but apparently authoritative.197
The law’s attempt to distinguish between “external” and
“internal” influences on jury deliberation is ultimately hopeless
in any event, but the thought experiment of the robot juror
illustrates this with unprecedented clarity.
Finally, let us briefly consider what the case of advanced
robots might suggest to us about the proper scope and limitations
of free speech law. Special constitutional protection for speech is
widely assumed to promote particular interests and values.198
Among the most commonly cited such interests and values are the
development of personal autonomy or self-realization, in one
sense or another; the optimal pursuit of truth in various fields; and
the promotion of democratic self-government.199
What we can learn from the advanced robot cases about
autonomy in the free speech context derives largely from broader
debates over the meaning of autonomy, as discussed above.200
Thinking about advanced robots in the contexts of the pursuit of
truth and of democratic self-governance, however, raises distinct
and important concerns.
In particular, consider the general problem of dominance and
inequality in electoral and other political contexts. Often,
dominance in otherwise democratic electoral contexts is thought
of in terms of wealth, wealth expenditures, campaign fundraising,
and campaign spending.201 But there are other potential forms of
dominance that could undermine the health of a democratic
electoral process. Whether advanced robots are allowed to vote
or not,202 it is at least conceivable that their203 practical impact on
197. See Brian Bergstein, The Great AI Paradox, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609318/the-great-ai-paradox/
[https://perma.cc/R5ZR-CXRY].
198. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 3-15 (1967); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY (1982); Kent Greenwalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 12024 (1989).
199. See sources cited supra note 198.
200. See supra Section III.
201. See generally J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money speech?,
85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1004 (1976); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 311-13 (2010) (discussing independent campaign
communication expenditures by for-profit and other corporate entities).
202. See generally supra notes 158-179 and accompanying text.
203. For some purposes, we would want to factor in the interests of all those persons,
corporate entities, or universities that crucially design and program the advanced robots, as
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elections could be disproportionate. Information gathering by
ordinary voters is already limited, whether rationally or not.204
What effects on truth seeking in politics, and on the health of
democracy, might ensue if voters felt intimidated by the
predictions and factual assertions of advanced robots? After all,
such advanced robots might be immensely, almost inconceivably,
knowledgeable.205
The rise of immensely knowledgeable advanced robots,
whether they dispute and contradict one another or not,206 might
involve a new manifestation of unhealthy dominance in the
electoral process. But whether we consider such a prospect to be
likely or not, working through the possible scenarios could benefit
us in the present.
In particular, the recurring problem of anti-intellectualism in
politics and in public policy choice207 is accompanied by a
common tendency to ascribe too much weight and authority to the
views and predictions of clearly knowledgeable experts.208
Consider this summary of his own extensive research by
Professor Philip Tetlock: “When we pit experts against
minimalist performance benchmarks¾dilettantes, dart-throwing
chimps, and assorted extrapolation algorithms¾we find few
well as non-persons including data bases or the descendants of Siri and Alexa, for whom
personhood might not be claimed. See generally Massaro & Norton, supra note 130, at 11921194; Tim Wu, Machine Speech; 161 U. PA. REV. 1495, 1499-1506 (2013); Tim Wu, Free
Speech
for
Computers?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
19,
2012),
www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion
/free-speech-for-computers.html
[https://perma.cc/WBL3-5KPS].
204. See generally SOMIN, supra note 167, at ch. 3.
205. We again set aside the complications created by information databases not
pretending to anything like conscious personhood.
206. Unfortunately, we cannot assume that a clash of opposing robot messages implies
a complete cancelation of their adverse effects on the health of electoral politics any more
than in the case of opposing corporate voices under Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310. For
further discussion of the controversy provoked by Citizens United, see, e.g., Laurence H.
Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. The Controversy, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 463,
464 (2015); Melina Constantine Bell, Citizens United, Liberty, and John Stuart Mill, 30
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2016) (Citizens United as undermining liberty
and self-government).’
207. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN
LIFE (Vintage Books, 1963).
208. See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW
CAN WE KNOW? (2005); PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORCASTING: THE
ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION 3 (2015). For Tetlock’s ongoing research project on
predictions see GOOD JUDGMENT(S) OPEN, www.gjopen.com [https://perma.cc/2MAVF9UB] (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
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signs that expertise translates into greater ability to make either
‘well-calibrated’ or ‘discriminating’ forecasts.”209
Imagining the overall effects of any number of expert robot
speakers210 thus encourages us to steer a constitutional and
personal choice between two extremes. Anti-intellectualism on
the one hand is ultimately a matter of illogic and self-destruction.
But so, on the other hand, is our tendency to extend undeserved
credit, and undeserved intellectual authority, to specialist
opinion-molders in general.211

V. CONCLUSION
There are several important lessons to be drawn from
reflecting on the possibility of deserved constitutional rights for
advanced robots. Most broadly, there is a heightened sense of the
importance of objective and subjectively adopted interests212 and
of the substantial long-term risks associated with adopting “thin”
understandings of autonomy and agency for constitutional
purposes.213
Less broadly, but still importantly, the idea of advanced
robots forces us to confront the question of the grounds on which
all persons are entitled to equal protection.214 As well, reflecting
on a possible right to vote has implications for the requirements
for, and value of, voting; the historical logic of women’s suffrage;
the relation between a right to vote and reproductive or privacy
rights; and the meaningfulness of minimum age and physical

209. TETLOCK, EXPERT, supra note 208, at 20. See TETLOCK, SUPERFORECASTING,
supra note 208, at 5 (“[w]hat my research had shown was that the average expert had done
little better than guessing on many of the political and economic questions I had posed”). “”
The experts tend to fare worst on predictions that could not be verified or falsified within the
immediate 3-5 year period. See id.
210. For discussion of a focus of speakers as distinct from an actual or potential
audience see Leslie Kendrick, Are Speech Rights for Speakers?, 103 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1767
(2017).
211. A robot expert might be best advised to cultivate the virtue of a realistic humility,
at least in the sense of a broad-based openness to continually reassessing its own judgments
and its decision-making processes. See TETLOCK, SUPERFORECASING, supra note 208, at
192.
212. See supra Section II.
213. See supra Section III.
214. See supra notes 127-157 and accompanying text.
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residency requirements in the context of voting.215 Questions of
advanced robot jury service shed light on familiar issues of bias
and discrimination, the proper use of peremptory and for cause
challenges, the quality of the jury deliberation process, and the
role of tacit or unteachable knowledge in rendering just
verdicts.216 Finally, questions of advanced robot free speech
rights force us to think again about the very meaning of the value
of autonomy, the possible forms and means of electoral
dominance, knowledge and ignorance in democratic decision
making, and the problems of both anti-intellectualism and
undeserved deference to remarkably fallible experts.217

215. See supra notes 158-177 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 178-195 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 196-211 and accompanying text.

